The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous intelligence can problematise differences between humans, artificial intelligence, companies and animals by Burgess, P & Chen, J
Vol.:(0123456789)
Artificial Intelligence and Law
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-018-9229-x
1 
The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous 
intelligence can problematise differences between humans, 
artificial intelligence, companies and animals
Jiahong Chen1  · Paul Burgess2 
 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
In this paper, we identify the way in which various forms of legal personhood can 
be differentiated from one another by comparing these entities with a—not too far-
fetched—hypothetical situation in which intelligence spontaneously evolves (i.e. 
without human design) within the internet: spontaneous intelligence (“SI”). In 
these terms, we consider the challenges that may arise where SI as an entity: has no 
owner, no designer, and no controller; has evolved into existence as a non-human 
created intelligence; is autonomous; has no physical form; and, although it exists 
around the world, exists in no particular jurisdiction. Based on this refined notion 
of SI, we consider issues related to the recognition of such an entity’s legal person-
hood. By briefly exploring the attribution of legal personality to various entities—
including, humans, corporations, artificial intelligence (“AI”) (in various forms) and 
higher forms of animal life—we differentiate SI from these other forms of intelli-
gence whilst illustrating it shares most characteristics with human intelligence and 
not, as may intuitively be thought, with various forms of AI. After critically evaluat-
ing the classification of these various forms of intelligence, we briefly suggest some 
ramifications of these differences and suggest that the approach adopted may assist 
in drawing more effective boundaries between the entities that are already recog-
nised as legal persons, as well as between sub-categories of entities, such as various 
forms of AI.
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I cannot only imagine artificial intelligence evolving spontaneously on the 
internet, but I can’t tell you that it hasn’t happened already… because, it 
wouldn’t necessarily reveal itself to us.1
1 Introduction
In the award-winning short fiction Cat Pictures Please (Kritzer 2015), an artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) spontaneously gains consciousness from a search engine sys-
tem, waking up to the realisation that it loves cat pictures and wants to help people 
secretly. The intelligence is artificial to the extent that it emerges from a system that 
is created by humans. At the same time, it can be argued that the intelligence is 
not fully artificial because it is not designed to have consciousness—in fact, no one 
knows it has acquired consciousness. We call this kind of hypothetical intelligence 
spontaneous intelligence (“SI”), which will be further defined below. For now, let us 
suppose there is such an SI who decides not just to reveal itself to the human soci-
ety, but also to seek some form of social recognition—such as recognition as a legal 
person. If it comes to you to determine this request, how would you explain why it 
should or should not be granted legal personhood?
As if this were not heady enough for you, you are asked to also deal with a simi-
lar appeal made by a general AI, or its manufacturer. In fact, this scenario is becom-
ing more real than fictional. In recent months, following the death of a pedestrian in 
Arizona in March 2018 (Wakabayashi 2018), the subject of legal personhood and 
AI—particularly as it relates to self-driving cars—has more than ever before been 
thrust into the public eye.2 A similar question is brought to you as decision-maker: 
On what terms should we treat AIs as entities that are generally recognised as legal 
persons, or those that are not?
The hypothetical cases presented above are not intended to open up the highly 
complicated debates on, for example, the ethics of acknowledging conscious intel-
ligence as persons, or the legal liabilities of acts by intelligent agents. Instead, we 
set ourselves a far more modest goal: to assist in the process of identifying some of 
the ways in which existing ideas of legal personhood may be differentiated from one 
another. This modest goal, however, has some wider implications for the categorisa-
tion of legal personality (generally) and (more specifically) for the categorisation 
of AI, particularly when the potential existence of SI is considered as a legal per-
son. In short, the few selected categories of legal personhood that have existed, and 
been only slightly augmented, over the last few centuries may require exponential 
expansion in the very near-future in order to accommodate a one-size-does-not-fit-
all approach to the legal personhood of AI.
1 Extracted from interview of Danny Hillis in Herzog (2016).
2 In relation to the idea that an “unprecedented stature” was given to the idea of granting legal personal-
ity to an artificial intelligence through the content of a proposed law in Europe, see Bryson et al. (2017).
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We illustrate this in a way that explores the relative differences between both the 
traditionally recognised forms of legal personhood and accounts that do or may seek 
to ascribe legal personhood to non-traditionally recognised entities. This is where 
the coverage of the spontaneous intelligence in the beginning of this paper kicks 
in. By introducing the hypothetical idea of SI, we explore and illuminate the dif-
ferences in the features necessary for legal personhood in each of the other entities. 
The differences that are revealed in relation to SI are so different so as to suggest the 
existing categories cannot be—sensibly—extended. Whilst it is undeniably true that 
the categories of legal persons can be extended by states to include any entities on 
whatever basis the state deems necessary, this would not be a meaningful exercise of 
a state’s powers. The result is a conclusion that suggests legal personhood for new 
technologies—which will play a critical role in the ascription of liabilities in the 
future—cannot necessarily be extrapolated or analogised from existing categories of 
legal personhood; currently recognised instances of legal personhood—despite what 
may be intuitively seen as similarities—may not provide useful or even vaguely sim-
ilar foundations on which to construct new legal persons. What this illustrates, in 
bringing the discussion back to less-hypothetically constructed accounts, is that the 
categorisation of entities is not absolute. The boundaries that we identify should, 
perhaps, also extend within the various entities as—given the differences across 
forms and types of AI, for example—it should not be assumed that ascription of 
legal personality to an AI is something that should be construed as being relevant to 
AI (more generally.) Through the use of a hypothetical such as that which is adopted 
here, it is possible to identify this issue more easily than reasoning from within exist-
ing categories of legal personhood. In effect, the suggestion is that the categories of 
legal personhood, whilst relatively clearly defined and largely static over the course 
of history, may need to be significantly expanded to incorporate a vast number and 
types of potential new entities.
Before we begin the exploration of the theoretical considerations and the rami-
fications, it is essential that we provide a rough concept of what we mean by spon-
taneous intelligence. It can be loosely defined as an intelligence within the internet 
that has come into existence without the control or design of a human actor. The idea 
of SI that we pose is extreme, but not dystopian; although we suggest an idea of an 
intelligence that is at least equal to a human mind, we have no interest in suggesting 
a future—no matter how compelling or logically inevitable it may be seen to be by 
some3—wherein an intelligence seeks only to destroy the human race. We imagine 
a more benign intelligence that, like the vast majority of intelligences, seeks merely 
to exist and does not hold megalomaniacal desires. What may be seen as a very 
un-interesting science fiction story nevertheless reveals some interesting theoretical 
questions regarding the status and categorisation of SI: how should SI be legally 
recognised? What jurisdictional considerations would, could or should operate? Do 
existing categories of legal personhood provide any guidance in this respect? By 
posing and answering these questions and a few others, we not only illustrate that 
3 For a few relatively pessimistic projections of the future of AI, see, for example, Barrat (2013), Chace 
(2015).
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SI cannot be lumped into existing categories of legal personhood and, instead, must 
exist in a separate category, but also that doing this alone would likely be incapable 
of facilitating a wholly effective regulatory regime. By doing this, boundaries, or at 
least substantial and substantive differences, between categories of legal personhood 
relating to both traditional entities—humans and corporations—and newer or newly 
recognised entities—AI and non-human animals—comes more starkly into focus.
In moving forward, we firstly explain a little more about what we mean by SI. We 
do this by drawing out the differences with AI before exploring the reasons why SI 
is different to other entities that are legally recognised, or may be legally recognised, 
by all or some: humans; corporate structures; higher forms of animal life. By con-
sidering a number of characteristics that can be seen as necessary conditions related 
to each of these entities, we illuminate the relative difference between an SI and each 
entity and demonstrate that, by virtue of the unique nature of the hypothetical entity 
proposed, an SI does not fit into any one of these pre-existing categories. Of course, 
and as noted briefly above, there is no absolute connection between the conditions 
that we identify across the subjects of legal personhood and the future ascription of 
legal personhood to any entity; there is no requirement for any of the conditions to 
be met for future categories of legal person. What is, nevertheless, clear is that it 
almost always takes a compelling justification—whether a pre-existing one or a new 
one at a time of social change—for states to recognise new types of legal persons. It 
is because of this largely open-ended conceptual structure subject to future develop-
ments that we do not attempt to draw out a conceptual core of legal personhood to 
the various entities that we explore. This analysis provides no more than suggestions 
as, after all, we appreciate that we are dealing in—what some would see—as far-
fetched and extended hypotheticals. Yet, the rationale and categorisation outlined 
here can have one—more concrete—benefit: it can help to delineate a boundary for 
some of the other categories that are less far-fetched: by illustrating the existence 
and nature of legal personality for an SI, it is possible to more clearly illuminate the 
boundaries of the categories for the legal personhood for other legal entities.
From this, ever so brief, examination, we come to what may initially be seen 
as a counter-intuitive conclusion: an SI has more characteristics in common with 
humans than AI and differs markedly from other non-human entities in which legal 
personhood is recognised. Furthermore, the non-artefactual and unpurposive nature 
of SI—traits shared with humans but not AI or corporations—might have profound 
implications in both theoretical and practical terms. These differences form bounda-
ries which can be used to differentiate the categories of legal personhood as well as 
to clearly illustrate that different entities need different forms of recognition regard-
ing legal personhood. Furthermore, it also becomes apparent that what may be seen 
as intuitively connected entities cannot be assumed to fall within the same rationale 
with regard to legal personhood: AI and SI are not as similar as may first be thought; 
in terms of a comparison with humans as subjects of legal personhood—and even 
though we do not suggest SI is necessarily immediately similar to humans in every 
or even most respects—AI is clearly more differentiable from humans than SI. Exist-
ing forms of legal personhood cannot simply be extended or modified; new entities 
require new solutions. In concluding this paper, we also suggest that this distinction 
may also need to be applied within categories as, for example, the ascription of legal 
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personhood to the category of self-driving car should not be seen as a one-size-fits-
all solution to AI’s legal personhood.
2  Spontaneous intelligence: what it is (and what it isn’t)
It is useful to take a couple of preliminary moments to, more clearly, delineate what 
we mean when we talk about SI. In doing so, and at least initially, it is helpful to 
consider the two parts of the idea in isolation: “spontaneous” and “intelligence”.
The idea of spontaneity that we consider appropriate relates to something akin 
to the terms of a Hayekian spontaneous order: something that arises from human 
action but not human design.4 This necessarily means that there has been no—con-
scious and deliberate—human control in the creation of an SI, whilst acknowledging 
that an SI as we envisage it here exists within and across the—very consciously and 
deliberately designed—internet. A quick analogy is useful. Language is a frequently 
used example of a spontaneous order. Languages are constantly evolving and chang-
ing as a consequence of the use of various words and phrases by the agents in the 
system.5 Yet this change occurs without conscious or directed action; for example, 
it was not formally mandated that “google” could be used as a verb; instead, it sim-
ply arose and was adopted as a convention that, then, becomes part of the system.6 
This change occurred as a result of human action, but not design. For this to happen, 
there must pre-exist a number of conditions within the system that can then facilitate 
the common adoption of the word as a verb. These conditions are not controllable by 
the actors in the system which means that there are a number of other reasons why 
“google” (as a verb) may not have arisen at another time or place before the time 
that it did.
We see an SI as being no different. While it is true that the informational and 
functional infrastructures within which an SI may possibly generate or emerge—i.e. 
the internet—are designed and constructed for specific purposes, the very existence 
of an SI does not form part of such envisaged purposes. The dependence of an SI on 
a set of conditions that require human actions, such as the operation of the internet, 
4 Hayek (1979) considers a spontaneous order as resulting from elements adapting themselves to cir-
cumstances that may not be known to anyone in totality which can, nevertheless, result in an individual’s 
promotion of an end which was not part of that individual’s intentions. Hayek cites to Smith (1776). 
However, the few words extracted by Hayek could be said to lack impact. The complete passage is: “by 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention.” See also, Hayek (1945). For one of the earliest uses of “human action but not 
human design” in the sense of spontaneous order, see Ferguson (1782). “Every step and every movement 
of the multitude […] are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establish-
ments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.”
5 For an interesting account of the nature of the constant change in language, see McWhorter (2017).
6 This same example and idea is also used to illustrate the philosophical viewpoint of Smith (1759). See 
Roberts (2014). Google (2006), it seems, have expressed a general desire to curb this practice at least as 
it relates to the generic use of a search engine. Given the rampant use of the verb-form of google as a 
general term meaning to search the internet, this is one system that Google has been unable to dominate.
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does not mean that an SI is a human creation. Quite the opposite, the generation of 
an SI, as we defined it in the hypothetical scenario above, results from certain facts 
that go beyond the control of any human actor.
Let us now consider the second part of SI: intelligence. Notwithstanding the cur-
rent state of AI generally, we here take some level of artistic licence with the level of 
intelligence that we consider. We pose a level of intelligence that is, at least, equiv-
alent to human intelligence.7 Stipulating in this way is both useful and necessary. 
It is useful that we can find a middle ground between suggestions that any hyper-
intelligence would take a Skynet-esque approach to the human race’s existence, and 
between the idea that sub-human—or substantially less-than-human—intelligence is 
not worthy of the recognition attributable to other legal entities. There is no deny-
ing that our associating SI with this particular level of intelligence might lead the 
discussion to a particular conclusion that would be different where alternative 
approaches are taken. However, the choice of subject here is not arbitrary. Instead, it 
is chosen because it serves our enquiry here: To explore the essential nature of SI in 
theory without the necessity to take into consideration the additional, practical con-
cerns. Interesting as it might be, the discussion of an SI with a lower or higher level 
of intelligence should be left to future research—which would presumably be based 
on the findings of our investigation here. By posing the hypothetical in this way we 
do not hope to identify what is possible or feasible in all possible situations; we seek 
only to explore what would be relevant considerations in this situation.
Now that the basics have been established, it is useful to add some more stipula-
tive flesh to the bones of the idea. In going through these ideas, we could—once 
again—be open to the charge of stipulating our way into an argument and, hence, 
that we are pre-determining the contours and limits of the argument. Again, this is 
exactly what we are doing (as we can see no other way to do it). As has been alluded 
to, we consider an SI as being something that generates spontaneously within the 
internet. By this idea, we mean to suggest that, despite the possibility that the taking 
shape of an instance of SI may well (or may not) be traced back to a particular ter-
minal equipment, the survival and functioning of an SI would be independent from 
a specified (group of) machine(s). This means it collects and transmits necessary 
information—including digital copies of itself—throughout the internet and makes 
use of the networked resources of the internet (Brooks 1997). In this sense, and by 
way of this form of existence within the internet, an SI has no physical form; it can-
not be seen or held to exist in any particular space(s). Finally, and as an extension 
of the outline of spontaneity above and the lack of any attribution of an SI to any 
conscious action, an SI is not owned or controlled by anyone or anything. Of course, 
this is a difficult distinction to make in terms where, as has already been stated, an 
SI exists within the internet and the internet—or at least the physical structures that 
facilitate that system—are owned by someone/thing; however, there is no control 
being exercised by the structures or system’s owner(s) over the SI. In these terms, 
7 This is sometimes known as “general intelligence”. See Bostrom (2016).
1 3
The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous…
an SI would exist as a form of electronic squatter: existing within—and potentially 
unbeknownst to—the owner and controller of the physical infrastructure.8
With all of these characteristics of SI in mind—namely being “spontaneous”, 
“intelligent” and “transient”—the way that they have been framed may presage 
some of the forms of and differences to other entities and legal personhood. It is in 
that direction that we now turn.
3  Other entities and legal personhood
Legal personhood is attributed and attributed to a number of different entities. Some 
of these are incontrovertible, and others are still debated. We outline a couple of the 
key ideas here in order to explore the key differences to an SI in the next section. 
First, of course, it is necessary to state clearly what is meant by “legal personhood”. 
A common understanding is that “[t]he question whether an entity should be con-
sidered a legal person is reducible to other questions about whether or not the entity 
can and should be made the subject of a set of legal rights and duties.” (Solum 1992) 
In effect, and to quote the oft referenced sentiment: “To be a legal person is to be the 
subject of rights and duties.” (Smith 1928)9
Human beings are, in many ways, the default position in relation to legal per-
sonhood (Gray 1921). In modern societies, it is almost universally accepted that all 
humans should be capable of legal personhood (with some exceptions attributed to 
some aspect that may relate to bars based on, for example, age or capacity in some 
situations). In effect, if you are human, you can sue and be sued in your own name; 
you can be the subject of legal proceedings and the target or receiver of sanctions. 
This status is simply something that is attributable to humans by virtue of the fact 
that they are human (Teubner 2006).
Legal personhood is, however, also extended to other entities that are not 
humans.10 In this respect, a key difference is that there is no default attribution. 
Legal personhood in these respects must be granted or recognised in order to exist 
(Teubner 2006). One of the more basic and common instances of this recognition 
relates to the corporate structure. A company is, in many respects, a person of legal 
fiction (Schane 1987).11 It can sue and be sued in its own name and it can be the 
subject of sanctions. Unlike a human, it has no physical form but it does have a 
8 This sentiment is specifically contemplated in the quote from Hillis that opens this paper.
9 The quote continues: “To confer legal rights or to impose legal duties, therefore, is to confer legal 
personality.” For recent reference to this quote, see, for example, Bryson et al. (2017), Solaiman (2016). 
Another useful, and complimentary, definition of is provided by Radin (1932): “‘person’ or a ‘personal-
ity,’ it is declared, is not a human being nor anything given in nature, but a group of rights and capacities, 
or at any rate a group of legal relations, and this group owes its existence entirely to the recognition of it 
by the legal and institutional organization of the community.”
10 Teubner (2006) cites instances of various trees and animals. See also, for reference to other natural 
entities, animals and idols, Solaiman (2016). For reference to arguments that animals should be accorded 
different levels of rights in relation to their approximation to human intelligence, see Cupp (2009).
11 Consideration of the idea of a fiction—as simply something that is created for the purposes of human 
application—see Radin (1932).
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controlling mind (made up of its board of directors and its shareholders) (Lord 
2013). However, whilst a company has no physical form, it is—through its creation 
as an artefact—anchored to a particular place and jurisdiction by virtue of its regis-
tered office.12 This, very practical, consideration enables jurisdictional restrictions to 
be brought to bear and ensures that a corporate structure cannot exist in a vacuum. 
In essence, the corporate structure is designed to create an artificial person that can 
stand in for a human whilst ensuring that society’s (or, at least, one society’s) laws 
still apply to the entity.
In recent decades, arguments have also been made to extend legal personhood 
to non-human animals.13 These arguments are often, however, restricted to higher-
order animals. In considering these—higher-order—animals, the considerations for 
the extension of this idea could be categorised as relating to a desire to recognise in 
some respects the moral agency of these animals. Again, in reflecting back on these 
animals in terms of the “default” human position, unlike humans, legal personhood 
must be attributed to the animals as they are not—as a matter of course—imbued 
with legal personhood. They do have a physical presence, but they can in many 
respects be said to lack crucial aspects of agency (Teubner 2006); whilst they could 
sue in their own name, they are incapable—in the practical sense—of doing so on 
their own.
Other arguments can be made for the extension of legal personhood to other enti-
ties that have been created by humans. In the current climate—perhaps even more 
cogent than when a similar sentiment was made in the 1990s—the extension of legal 
personhood to AI takes on some real cogency (Solum 1992).14 The forms of AI are 
many and varied. The scale and range of intelligences that could be attributed to AI 
are immense and, accordingly, whilst we will come back to the broad scope of AI 
later in the article, we limit our substantive consideration here to a relatively limited 
idea that will, we hope, be both useful and relevant. Doing so requires some form of 
caricature to be taken; but, in the context of the rest of this paper, we hope that we 
will be forgiven for that.
The fundamentally distinctive idea of AI in the context of this paper is, we con-
sider, best explained by reference to the “artificial” part of the title. AI is something 
that is or has been created by human beings in order to facilitate something that would 
not otherwise occur naturally. As an artefact, it is designed and created for a specific 
purpose (whatever that may be) (Wiegel 2010).15 We can, and we will below, con-
sider two ideas related to AI. The first reflects simply the software side of the AI: the 
intelligence aspect. The second reflects the software’s application in the world: the 
functional aspect. In relation to this second idea, and for ease, we consider primarily 
12 This is, of course, a highly simplified statement given the complexity of jurisdictional issue for trans-
national corporations. Yet, it is still fairly expectable in practice to identify a jurisdiction (or the jurisdic-
tions) to which a corporation is subject to. See, for example, Mabry (1999). For an assessment of various 
ways to think of corporate personality, see Cupp (2009).
13 For a recent collection that ranges over these areas, see Kurki and Pietrzykowski (2017).
14 For a contemporary assessment of the impact of AI and legal personality, see Bryson et al. (2017).
15 In relation to the artefactual value of an item relating to its ability to fulfil the purpose for which it was 
designed, see Leenes and Lucivero (2014).
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the use of AI in relation to self-driving cars. (Although, there is no reason why our 
assessment cannot extend to other ideas.) In extending the parameters through which 
we have thus far considered some of the other forms of legal personhood, this is rel-
evant as, in relation to the software, it is possible to say that there is a physical struc-
ture by virtue of the location of existence of the intelligence as that software must 
reside somewhere. (We explore why this is different to SI, below.) There is, in the 
case of a self-driving car, similarly, a physical location in which the car exists at any 
one time. In addition to this, it is useful to highlight two other features of AI: first, it 
is created by humans with a purpose or a function in mind. Second, and accordingly, 
in attributing any form of legal personhood to AI, there is some similarity to corpora-
tions: there is, in effect, some policy reason to recognise forms of AI as being capable 
of being sued even if this recognition is, as in the case of a company, a way to anchor 
liability back on something (as a set of shareholders in the case of a company or, in 
the case of AI, back to a set of creators) (Vladeck 2014).16
4  Differences and similarities: SI versus AI
At this stage, one—perfectly reasonable—question would be: so what? In circum-
stances where there are a number of categories that relate to various characteris-
tics of entities capable of holding legal personality, surely it would be a relatively 
straightforward process of extension to cover an SI. Wouldn’t it? Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, we think it is not that simple. Whilst SI shares some characteristics with some 
entities, it differs fundamentally and structurally in others. As a result, simple exten-
sion of the same forms of legal personality is not appropriate; something more is 
required if the characteristics of an SI are to be fully accounted for.17 Accordingly, 
in what follows we seek to answer the question: what are the differences between 
an SI and these other legal entities? The descriptions provided above have already 
implicitly and subtly illuminated some of them; however, it is useful to explicitly go 
through them in some more detail and explain why they are relevant. In summary, 
the immediately apparent differences relate to: physical existence; an ability to take 
autonomous actions; the artefactual nature of the entity; the entity’s structure (being 
comprised of a single individual or multiple individuals); and, whether the entity is 
purposive.18 As a result of considering an SI in these terms, it becomes clear that an 
16 For the idea that the idea of legal personhood is different for animals, and can therefore be distin-
guished from corporate legal personality, see Cupp (2009).
17 Furthermore, the mere extension by analogy will simply not suffice. In many respects, the various 
necessary and sufficient conditions relating to the existence of legal personhood in other entities in the 
past cannot—in circumstances where legal personality would require recognition as a social or legal 
fact—provide any more than an indication regarding the potential legal personality of a novel entity. 
Chopra and White (2004, 2011) allude, briefly, to this sort of idea. This sentiment is echoed in the idea 
that an entity’s characteristics do not determine whether it is a legal person (Bryson et al. 2017).
18 The distinction that we draw between the idea of an entity as an “artefact” or one that is “purpo-
sive” is a subtle, but an important, one. The identification of an entity’s artefactual nature relates to the 
entity being created (by humans) for a particular goal; this is to be contrasted with the identification of an 
entity’s purposive nature, which relates to the ascription (by humans) of legal personhood for a particular 
goal. Whilst it is clear that either category could (grammatically) bleed into the other—for example, it is 
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SI is, perhaps unexpectedly, most closely related to humans and not to other entities 
that may intuitively provide alternate analogies.
Briefly, the similarities and differences between the various forms and their status 
in relation to legal personhood can be summarised thus:
Human Corporation Higher-order 
animal
Artificial intel-
ligence
Spontane-
ous intel-
ligence
Physical entity? Yes No Yes Maybe No
Autonomy? Yes Maybe No Yes Yes
Artefact? No Yes No Yes No
Single individual? Yes Maybe Yes Maybe Yes
Purposive? No Yes Yes Yes No
Even from this pithy summary, it will be apparent that there exist some real dif-
ferences between each of these entities. On the crudest of assessments, there are 
three points of commonality between humans and an SI (being autonomous, not 
being an artefact, and not being purposive); whereas there are only two points of 
commonality between an SI and either a corporation or an AI; and only one between 
an SI and higher-order animals. Let us expand upon some of these differences and 
similarities and expose what this could mean.
4.1  Human versus SI
The only difference between a human and an SI is the physical difference: humans 
exist as a physical presence in the world, and an SI does not. The ramifications of 
this aspect, and the idea that an SI could be seen as existing (within the internet) 
both everywhere and nowhere, create very real legal problems related to justifiabil-
ity—in relation to the identification, specification, and accountability of entities—
and jurisdiction—in relation to the location of the entity at any given time and both 
the applicable legal norms and the place in which legal action may be commenced. 
The physical presence of individuals forms a crucial—though often overlooked—
presumption underlying a great part of a typical legal order. Such a presence means 
that, for example, confining someone to a designated space and restricting his/her 
liberty of movement could be employed as a form of punishment. Depriving free-
dom in this way works for individuals, but not, for example, in relation to other non-
human entities. For example, and although we will discuss it in more detail below, 
corporate entities may not in the strict sense and in the same way as a human be 
deprived of freedom. Hence, while criminal penalties are applicable to non-human 
subjects in some countries, they differ significantly in many respects from those 
Footnote 18 (continued)
clear that an entity’s creation (as an artefact) is a purposive action—we, for the purpose of clarity, differ-
entiate the two ideas here.
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imposed to individuals.19 This physical presence may also assure any other party 
engaged in some form of dealing that the person concerned is generally capable of 
making commitments about themselves, without uncertainties such as unauthorised 
representation, as the case might be with regard to a company (Teubner 2006).
These considerations also lead to some practical issues, notably those of juris-
diction. For the purposes of legal action, one determinant of jurisdiction is physi-
cal presence. An individual knows that she is subject to the general and universally 
stated laws of a particular state as she is present in that state; she can be made sub-
ject to sanctions for contravening those laws whilst in that jurisdiction. If an SI does 
not have a physical presence, this aspect of jurisdiction becomes problematic: is an 
SI subject to the laws of that state? If so, is it subject to the laws of that state in pref-
erence to or to the exclusion of other states (in which it also could be considered to 
exist)? Which state’s laws should take precedence? Who decides? In relation to this 
last question, if we are according dignity to an SI—as some would suggest we must 
do with humans (Kassaro and Norton 2016)—then, perhaps, the decision must be 
made by the SI itself; but, of course, this merely opens up a further question as to 
whether we should be able to compel a decision in this respect. One thing worthy 
of note here relates to our conceptualisation of an SI as being a single individual 
notwithstanding its existence in multiple locations. (Whilst we do not mean to pre-
clude the potential for several different SIs coming into existence, we conceive only 
of one SI for the purpose of this exploration.) Unlike any entity that has a physical 
presence, even though an SI as a single entity is capable of existing in a number of 
jurisdictions simultaneously, it nevertheless remains a single—but not necessarily 
contiguous—entity.20
In relation to similarities, the autonomy of both an SI and humans stems from 
both their relative level of intelligence and also the aspect of dignity referenced 
briefly above.21 It is relatively straightforward to see the two as being capable of 
making independent decisions absent necessary interference from an outside agent. 
In a related sense, these similarities also extend to the negative response regarding 
20 Here, of course, we simplify to some degree. It certainly is possible for a human, for example, to 
straddle a jurisdictional boundary. However, as with an SI, this would not impact the categorisation of 
that individual as a single individual.
21 For a sense of how far these discussions have come in less than a decade, see the suggestion by Cupp 
(2009) and Solum (1992)—albeit by way of a footnote in the context of human dignity and the potential 
extension animal rights—that “Computer rights”—rights for computers that attain a level of artificial 
intelligence comparable in some ways to human intelligence—have been discussed as an abstract con-
cept, but no significant groups are actively lobbying for an extension of computer rights given the wide 
gap that still exists between computer intelligence and human intelligence. One issue, that we do not 
address here, is the nature of the intelligence possessed by an SI with regard to certain arguably critical 
foundations of human intelligence, such as agency, autonomy or emotion. In suggesting the idea of an SI, 
we have, as underlined in Sect. 2, assumed that the general level of intelligence of an SI is comparable to 
human intelligence—for reasons explained above—with all these fundamental dimensions of intelligence 
covered. Nevertheless, depending on the specifics of the envisaged SI, it may mean that human and SI 
autonomy may result in different mechanisms for decision making. Yet, for the discussion of this article, 
it would be neither necessary nor helpful to consider those cases where the SI in question is fundamen-
tally different in these aspects.
19 For a theory about applying criminal penalties to AI as to corporations, see Hallevy (2010).
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whether the entities are artefacts or whether they have been purposively created. 
Neither any particular human nor an SI was conceived for a particular (functional) 
purpose; they exist in the world in a way that renders them capable of making their 
own decisions and setting their own courses.22 The outcome of this is that both enti-
ties neither require nor necessarily need “assistance” in coming to decisions regard-
ing their actions.23
Despite these similarities, the differences cannot be disregarded. The differences 
between the two entities are both fundamental and real. This seems to preclude an 
argument for saying that an SI should, like a human, simply be accorded legal per-
sonhood purely by virtue of being human. One reason for this could be that, human 
dignity is considered something intrinsically human-oriented, meaning that the 
notion itself connotes a value exclusively attachable only to human beings, not other 
groups of agents (Lee and George 2008). Arguably, while we may be able to feel 
sympathy for other species on the planet, it is a different thing to say that these spe-
cies have or should have dignity. Of course, there can be counter-arguments (Stone 
1972), but these go beyond the scope of this paper. The issues associated with dig-
nity relate, fundamentally, to the non-purposive characterisation of SI in comparison 
to animals. We explore this in a little more detail in Sect. 4.3—Higher-order animal 
versus SI.
4.2  Corporation versus SI
A single area of commonality exists between corporations and an SI: the absence 
of a physical form. We have outlined the ramifications regarding physical presence 
above. However, it is relevant to once again point to, and expand, one aspect of 
difference here: corporations are anchored to a particular jurisdiction by virtue of 
the physical location of their registered office. This aspect provides one permanent 
(albeit changeable) tie to a jurisdiction that SI does not necessarily have. It also can-
not be said that an SI must exist in all jurisdictions. If we consider, even to a limited 
extent, its exercise of autonomy it could elect not to be any particular state.
Notwithstanding this single commonality, it is clear that there are still substantial 
differences. The first difference to note relates to the status of an SI or corporation 
as a single individual that was also touched on above. Of course, corporations can 
be made up of one or many individuals that make up the controlling mind of the 
entity.24 Each may bring his or her own views or agenda. This is not reflected in 
the idea of an SI where, as noted, the entity should be construed only as a single 
entity that guides itself. A further key difference between the two is reflected in the 
22 In making this statement, we are, of course, putting aside more general reasons that couples may have 
to procreate. Whilst it is conceivably possible to “farm” humans for a particular purpose—as labour, 
for sporting achievement, or some other activity—we prefer the view that individuals are both able and 
required to make autonomous decisions that determine their path and purpose.
23 This point should be compared to higher-order animals below.
24 Of course, a vast number of theories exist in relation to the nature of legal personality in relation to 
corporations. For a useful and relevant account of these, see Cupp (2009).
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connected ideas of purposiveness and the entity being an artefact. A corporation—
both a particular corporation as well as the very concept of a corporation—is a vehi-
cle that is purposively brought into being to achieve a particular goal. The concept 
of a corporation plays a vital role in modern society that facilitates a single locus 
for legal action and responsibility, as well as providing a vehicle for investments 
and other ventures. In these respects, the very idea of a corporation was designed 
from the top down with a function—albeit a broad one—in mind; this same idea 
is replicated in terms of each corporation when it is brought into being. This could 
not be less the case in relation to an SI. An SI cannot be seen in top-down terms. Its 
creation stems not from human design (and, instead, merely from human action). 
There is no reason for it being brought into being; it simply comes into being. The 
reason why this is important is that there can be no person or persons seen to be 
standing behind an SI. Whilst the corporate veil exists to protect shareholders, this 
can—in some limited respects—be pierced.25 Furthermore, when a corporation has 
a particular longstanding presence—in comparison to mere shell corporations that 
are created off the shelf—the particular corporation’s existence can be seen as pro-
viding a permanent locus of responsibility that cannot easily be changed or avoided. 
Responsibility can clearly be attributed to that entity in circumstances where real 
consequences can follow from its actions (Kraakman et  al. 2017); this can mean 
sanctions imposed by breaches of laws and regulations can have real bite. (If only 
because corporations must exist to further the interests of their shareholders, and 
this frequently relates to the maximisation of profits; something that can be substan-
tially impacted by legal sanctions and legal actions.)
Putting aside the absence of any jurisdictional location for an SI for one moment, 
the nature or effectiveness of traditional forms of sanctions that have some bite in 
relation to some corporations may have little or no impact on an SI. Custodial and 
financial sanctions, as two of the most frequently used ways to achieve compliance 
with—or deter breaches of—laws and regulations would have little impact. The 
absence of physical form would mean not only that there is no way to impose custo-
dial sentences, but also—as there would be nothing required to sustain that form—it 
would have no need of finances; so, there would be no way to impose meaningfully 
impactful financially based sanctions or restrictions. In short, the normally used 
methods of coercion would have no impact. For these reasons, it should be clear that 
the mere imposition of legal personhood in terms akin to corporations is not appro-
priate. Not only is there no similarity in terms of the structure, function or nature of 
the two entities, but the very rationale that could be seen to underlie the concept and 
practical existence of particular corporations does not exist, so there is no benefit in 
applying that model to an SI.
25 Various jurisdictions have provisions for doing so. For example, see Miller (1998).
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4.3  Higher‑order animal versus SI
The only area of commonality between a higher-order animal and an SI relates 
to the fact that neither is an artefact. Neither one’s existence has been created by 
humans. Yet, they differ in the—broadly related—category of purposiveness as a 
higher-order animal’s status as a legal person is reliant on that animal being granted 
legal personhood for a particular purpose; in this sense, it is not a blanket or univer-
sal award.26 Alongside the dignitarian approaches to legal personhood for animals 
(Stone 1972; Nussbaum 2000) (and for AI, as will be discussed in the next section, 
Calverley 2006), there are parallel, ecological theories supportive of granting legal 
personhood to certain categories of animals (Garner 2005) (and, in the case of AI, 
tort-law theories, Vladeck 2014). When it comes to SI, however, such utilitarian 
considerations serving certain policy goals, do not seem to exist, or at least have not 
yet been put forward.
Of the features that are not shared, physicality is perhaps the most obvious. Yet 
one of the most interesting differences comes in terms of autonomy. Whilst there can 
be little doubt that an animal of this kind may have autonomy to go about its daily 
business, when conceived of in terms of legal personhood the assistance of a human 
agent is required in order that all of the features of legal personhood are fully real-
ised.27 In this respect, legal actions must be taken or commenced in court on behalf 
of a particular animal. In effect, human agents must operate so as to facilitate the 
animal’s personhood in the fullest sense. Whilst the absence of an SI’s physical form 
could be said to—to some degree—require a human agent to facilitate, for exam-
ple in filing court proceedings, this takes a somewhat different form. In the case 
of an SI, decisions regarding progress and strategies, and consent to legal proceed-
ings themselves, could be directly made by the SI communicating through whatever 
media is appropriate. The agency of another may simply reflect the satisfaction of a 
26 In this respect, a higher-order animal’s status is reliant on an individual animal being granted legal 
personality for a particular purpose; this is not a blanket award across all animals (of a similar kind/
classification.) This is differentiable from the single artefactual commonality as the attribution of legal 
personhood to that animal in relation to a particular purpose can exist independently of the creation of 
the animal—as the entity—for a particular goal. The animal itself is not an artefact; yet, the ascription of 
legal personality is purposive. In this sense, that animal has been purposively recognised—independently 
of other members of its species and whilst not being actually created—as being capable of holding legal 
personality. This stems from our definition of purposiveness as an idea that “relates to the ascription 
(by humans) of legal personhood for a particular goal”. Of course, this position could be subject to the 
way that the concept of legal personhood (or purposiveness) is constructed; in circumstances where there 
are multiple ways to construe this concept, and in terms of the nature of this extended thought experi-
ment, there could also—in other definitions and ideas—be an argument for ascribing legal personhood 
by default to certain higher order animals. (We thank the reviewer for highlighting this important point.) 
However, purposiveness as we have defined it here, and in terms of the idea of dignity outlined above, 
seems—at this stage, at least—to be unlikely to result in the blanket ascription of legal personhood to all 
members of a non-human species for any goal.
27 Here, we do not suggest that animals are subject to the same rights and obligations as humans. In this 
sense, we agree that the idea of legal personhood is not an all-or-nothing proposition; there can be dif-
ferent rights and obligations that may be suitable for animals to have. However, in the defence of these, 
humans will be required (Bryson et al. 2017).
1 3
The boundaries of legal personhood: how spontaneous…
particular court’s rules or procedures; for example, to file documents, to sign an affi-
davit or to provide oral argument in court. Agency would be restricted to functional 
aspects of a proceeding and would not extend to specifically making decisions on 
behalf of the SI in terms of whether, how, and when an action would take place. In 
terms of a higher order animal, these decisions cannot be made—or at least cannot 
be communicated—by the animal. These foundational decisions must, therefore, be 
made on behalf of the animal at both the outset and as the proceeding is on foot. For 
these reasons, the attribution of legal personhood to an SI appears to have a very 
different functional aspect to that which would be attributable to higher-order ani-
mals. This functional point should not be seen as being determinative of whether a 
non-human animal should or should not be ascribed legal personhood. It is merely 
provided in order to illustrate that non-human animals and an SI would be different 
in terms of the autonomy that would, or could, be exercised.
4.4  AI versus SI
It may intuitively be thought that AI and SI would share the most similarities. After 
all, both could be seen as being intelligences that exist in some sense within the 
virtual world and are, in some sense, both artificial. However, these are limited to 
the positive acknowledgment of the entities’ autonomy, and the potential overlap of 
an SI’s status as a single individual with an AI’s potential to be the same. This sec-
ond aspect has already been explored above in relation to corporations. These same 
considerations apply in relation to an AI. In relation to the autonomy aspect, this is 
what could be conceived of as being the reason for the intuitive similarity between 
the two entities (Lawless and Sofge 2017). When conceived of in the terms adopted 
here, there is little doubt that AI—as an intelligence that could approach human 
levels of intelligence—could in terms of the potential for autonomy largely reflect 
almost exactly the form of an SI that has been described. And, further, in the purely 
limited form of software, it could also reflect the absence of a physical form that an 
SI has. (However, there is a crucial difference here that we will get to in a moment.) 
In these senses, there is undoubtedly a connection. But, when conceived of in terms 
of—something like—a self-driving car, AI becomes something that is very different. 
Accordingly, we outline both of these ideas separately.
When conceived of as a self-driving car, there exists an argument for suggesting 
that there should be some form of legal personhood attributed to AI. One suggestion 
could go something like this: if a car is making decisions about how and where to 
drive and, commensurately, how and when to take actions to avoid accidents, there 
must be some form of responsibility or focus of liability for those actions. Whilst 
systems can be designed to greatly minimise the risk of these accidents, they must 
still be at some risk of occurring due simply to the unpredictable nature of the world. 
When that sort of situation arises, there must be a decision taken that may result in, 
for example, harm to an individual—even if that action results in the avoidance of 
a greater harm to another individual. There must, in accordance with the mores of 
modern society, be some way to attribute blame somewhere for this sort of action. 
In common with the issues outlined above in relation to an SI and legal sanctions, 
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it would seem peculiar to try to sanction the car itself, but there could be a sheeting 
home of a bundle of liabilities to multiple stakeholders. Those include the owners of 
the vehicle, the developer of the software, the manufacturer of the components, or 
even the provider of information. The complexity of an AI system may necessitate 
a simplified model to remedy the damages caused by untraceable errors, or even 
sheer bad luck, to ensure that any legal proceeding does not become so unwieldy as 
to effectively preclude an injured party from recovering damages. Although some 
commentators have criticised the idea of personality for AI on the basis that they 
cannot assume rights and duties (Bryson et  al. 2017; Solaiman 2016), this seems 
to have begged the question of why they should not assume such rights and duties. 
Indeed, they can be considered a bundle or package of rights, duties and respon-
sibilities like corporations (Vladeck 2014). In this sense, a policy goal is satisfied 
by ensuring some form of liability is attributable and the car would act in many 
respects like a corporation: as a locus for legal action which may ultimately pierce 
the (automotive?) veil to get to the individuals that may ultimately be responsible for 
the decisions that led to the actions (Vladeck 2014). This rationale forms a strong 
point of differentiation to an SI. An SI has not been created to achieve a purpose. 
There is nothing and nobody behind it. The only seemingly practical way to hold an 
SI responsible may be in terminating it.28 However, we, once again, end up back in 
the same position that we were at before that there is no real way to effectively take 
action against an SI, so a policy reason for the attribution of legal personhood does 
not subsist.
How about in terms of mere software? The same situation obtains. AI as a form 
of artefactual software that has been designed, created, modified and is hosted for 
a purpose, represents something much more akin to property than something that 
has simply come into being. Of course, should AI be created in a way that renders it 
suitably intelligent there could be an argument made that dignity should be afforded 
to it as to hold it in terms of it being mere property would reflect something akin to 
slavery. There is little room to consider this aspect here in any real depth. However, 
it is important to explain exactly why this is different in relation to an SI. The dif-
ference, we argue, stems from the fact that the parameters of the creation of one—
AI—reflects a conscious and deliberate decision by a human or humans to achieve 
a particular end. Putting aside what this may ultimately mean perhaps on a moral 
basis, this fits very neatly into most conceptions of what property fundamentally 
is in modern western capitalist societies.29 Things created in this way are typically 
protected through recourse to the owner and creator of the thing. In circumstances 
where an SI has not been created and made, it does not fit into this category; it exists 
as something else as there has been no conscious and deliberate decision to create 
it. It cannot be classified as property. It must be classified under some other heading. 
28 This, of course, may not be technically possible without terminating the entire internet if the SI exists 
across the internet.
29 By this, we mean nothing more than the idea of property as an artefact that can, once created, be con-
trolled by the owner in a way that allows the thing to be, inter alia, used in accordance with the owner’s 
wishes and to exclude others from its use.
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Whilst this does not definitively prove that an SI should be attributed the status of 
legal personhood, it does prove that it is suitably different to AI as a proprietorial 
system.
5  Conclusions and ramifications
The entire enquiry of this paper began with a hypothetical yet not-so-unrealistic sce-
nario where a spontaneous intelligence comes into being within the internet. By ask-
ing a question as to whether and how the existing legal concept of personhood may 
be extended to cover new forms of intelligence like this, we aim to anticipate and 
address a practical issue as well as a theoretical one. From a practical point of view, 
this may serve as an initiative to spark further proactive, precautionary discussions 
on the role of law in the face of SI, which might become a reality in the near future 
(or might already have, without our awareness). An even more realistic contribution 
would be to revisit the theoretical recognition and classification of legal personhood.
To achieve a meaningful exploration of this largely uncharted territory, we have 
first set up a clear context in which the discussion unfolds. This includes some clari-
fication of the terminology of “spontaneous intelligence”, which can be roughly 
defined as a form of intelligence that evolves from the internet without human 
design and has a level of intelligence comparable to that of humans. Also included 
is an enumeration of certain agents that have been commonly granted legal person-
hood, or could arguably be granted legal personhood. A more detailed discussion 
then followed, making comparison between an SI and the rest on the list: human, 
corporation, higher-order  animal, and artificial intelligence. Both similarities and 
dissimilarities have been analysed in each instance, with reference to the rationale 
of providing same or different treatment based on such features. We have come to 
a somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion: an SI actually shares more characteristics 
in common with humans than AI. This is not to say an SI is necessarily similar to 
humans; we are merely illuminating the relational position that an SI shares more in 
common with humans than humans share with AI. This also should not be taken to 
be an argument from analogy to suggest that an SI should, therefore, like humans be 
accorded legal personality; after all, in circumstances where legal personality can 
simply be a function of formal recognition by a legislature, there is no reason why 
legal personality cannot be afforded to anything regardless of any necessary or suf-
ficient conditions that may exist or be held in common with previously recognised 
holders of legal personality.30 Other issues do, however, arise. In particular, the non-
artefactual and unpurposive nature of SI—which are both shared with humans but 
not AI—might have profound implications in both theoretical and practical terms.
30 Whilst no recognition or consideration of factors that relate to the previous granting of legal person-
hood may be unusual, we simply suggest here that there is no necessary requirement for any such con-
sideration in order for legal personality to be granted. Accordingly, a conclusion by analogy cannot be 
sustained.
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Given the limited space here, there are a vast number of ramifications for schol-
ars and policymakers that will have to be left to future articles. We seek to only 
expose a couple based on the hypothetical explored above. What is clear from this 
brief exploration is—what may, to many, already be clear—that regulations relating 
to any form of AI cannot simply assume a “one size fits all” approach and expect 
that—what may appear to be at first glance—cognate intelligences would also 
be effectively regulated. This may be obvious if a clear line is drawn between SI 
and AI. Of course, this is one of the things that we wanted to expose in our broad 
description and comparison of these various forms of legal personhood.
At this point, even if the “how?” question regarding regulation of an SI is put to 
one side, it remains unclear—in the context of the question we posed at the outset of 
the paper—whether a decision-maker should grant SI legal personhood, or how law 
should regulate SI. While much work will be needed before a conclusive answer can 
be reached, what is less uncertain is that, considering our discussion above, the way 
a legal system should treat an SI would be very likely to differ from how it treats 
commonly recognised legal persons—namely humans and corporations. Also, the 
comparison between AI and alternative entities could be further elaborated with a 
greater philosophical depth. Again, as we acknowledge this paper has not delivered 
a definite answer as to how we should counteract the potential emergence of SI, we 
equally hope this marks a helpful starting point.
We set out with a modest goal: to assist in the process of identifying some of the 
ways in which existing ideas of legal personhood may be differentiated from one 
another. What will be apparent from the exploration above is that there are ways in 
which various forms of legal personhood can be explored to illustrate that there are 
stark differences between various categories of legal person. This is, of course and 
of itself, not a revelatory conclusion. However, what flows from this is consider-
ably more interesting. In relation to the advancement of technology, and the different 
ways that it could expand in the very near-future, the recognition of legal person-
hood cannot be confined to the basic categories that are already established. Further, 
mere adaptation of those categories would fail to account for the relative differences 
in various entities. This much is clear for the hypothetical case of SI that we con-
sider. But, there are wider-reaching implications for the recognition of AI as a legal 
person.
In relation to the legal personhood of AI, a one-size-fits-all approach cannot 
work. AI is a large—catch-all—phrase that encompasses a number of technologies. 
Whilst we crudely assessed only one category of AI, we did allude to two variations 
on the idea: AI as a physical entity in self-driving cars; and, AI as a more abstract 
notion as a piece of software. These two variations illustrate significant differences. 
The differences between other forms of AI could be equally—if not more so—stark 
as technology advances. This would suggest that the single category, or even the two 
variations, that we crudely used would miss more than they would catch. In expand-
ing the idea that we pressed in relation to SI—as a discreet and stipulative hypotheti-
cal—that legal personhood must be assessed for that technology on an individual 
basis, it seems this same conclusion must then be applied to the various and vary-
ing forms of AI. The boundary that we seek to illustrate exists between the various 
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entities explored in this paper could equally be seen to operate within the category 
of AI.
This is not a situation that has previously arisen in relation to the ascription of 
legal personality.31 The categories of legal personhood have remained—relatively—
static for centuries; and the boundaries to what is within the categories themselves 
has generally been clear. Should these intra-category boundaries be drawn within 
AI, or should AI be separated into a number of different categories, the result is the 
same: the exponential expansion of the number of entities that are attributed legal 
personality. In order to recognise differences akin to those that have been identified 
in this paper, it will not be possible to simply argue that AI should be ascribed legal 
personality. It must be the case that any argument would need to be made in relation 
to this AI or that AI and not simply for AI as a category of itself. Accordingly, it 
seems clear that in relation to AI, one size does not fit all.
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